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Abstract: 
Although Thomas Mann’s novel The Magic Mountain has been the object of 
innumerable studies, this paper suggests that so far none of these has given truly close 
attention to the significance of the classical references in this novel with regard to the 
search for a true humanism. This is probably owing to the generally held belief that the 
influence of the classical tradition is relatively inconsequential in relation to the ample 
conjunction of philosophical ideas on which the novel is based. This article takes a 
differing view and, through a close analysis and comment of the explicit and implicit 
classical notions in the text, concludes that these ideas are also a valuable key to a 
greater comprehension of the ideological design of the main character, Hans Castorp, 
and to a certain degree they also help to continue to reflect on the most enigmatic and 
controversial episode of the novel: the young protagonist’s descent to the plain from the 
magical mountain (Zauberberg) in order to take part in the great tragedy of World War 
I, alien as is any war to the prevalent but ultimately futile desire that love (Liebe) should 
in the end prevail in the life of humans. 
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     In view of the extensive bibliography devoted to the analysis of the classic of 
contemporary literature that is Thomas Mann’s The Magic Mountain3, it would be 
logical to consider that there is scant room for further contributions. Or, to put it more 
strongly, a critic or scholar should be firmly convinced of the value of what he or she 
nonetheless ventures to write, if the readers are not to be disappointed. Indeed, any 
analysis entails segmenting a unity to attain a better understanding of it, yet the unity 
does not disappear, so that, in spite of calling attention to the classical notions present 
throughout the novel
4
, readers, exercising their inalienable right, will decide whether 
these pages enable a deeper reading of this long philosophical novel or not
5
.   
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  This article was published in LEXIS, Poetica, retorica e comunicazione nella tradizione classica, 32, 
2014, 422-444. 
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Ridley 1994; Kurzke 1987; Stock 1986, and as a general introduction: Schöll 2013.   
4
 However, I should like to emphasize that the aim of this article is not to look for or to identify the 
translations used by Mann.  In this sense, see, e.g. the essay by Lukács 1911, Die Seele und die Formen, 
with the quotations in his works from Platonic dialogues in the translation by Rudolf Kassner, or Reed 
1974, Thomas Mann: the Uses of Tradition regarding Tod in Venedig. On the other hand and by and 
large, as far as the translations are concerned, by no means we should expect in my opinion to find them 
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seelische Gültigkeit...». My aim is above all to analyse and comment the significance of the explicit and 
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     The Magic Mountain is a formative novel, a Bildungsroman, in the course of which 
we witness the strengthening of the intellectual and above all human edification of its 
main protagonist, the young engineer Hans Castorp. Just after his graduation, still free 
of professional commitments, he embarks on a trip in order to visit a cousin of his, 
Joachim, who hopes to recover from his tuberculosis in a high mountain sanatorium that 
will also become a decisive place for our protagonist after an unexpected seven years’ 
stay. For the sake of achieving the intellectual development just referred to, Mann 
designs a repeated and ardent confrontation of theses between two highly intellectual 
patients of the sanatorium, Naphta and Settembrini, worthy masters who will provide 
the dual theoretical basis upon which will eventually stand the young man’s unique 
personal criterion
6
. In effect, given his deep sense of duty and fairness, with the 
intention of hearing both sides, «Hans Castorp listened to Herr Settembrini... And all the 
while he was finding it more and more permissible to give his thoughts and dreams free 
rein in another and quite opposite direction (in entgegengesetzer Richtung)» (158)
7
. 
Settembrini, for his part, respects Naphta’s «discursive nature (diskursive Natur)» and 
likes «to cross swords with an antagonist who is after all my equal». Very often they 
quarrel till they draw blood, but «the contrariness and mischievousness (die 
Gegensätzlichkeit und Feindseligkeit) of his ideas but render our acquaintance the more 
attractive. I need the friction (Friktion). Opinions cannot survive if one has no chance to 
fight for them (zu kämpfen)» (407). Throughout the novel there will certainly be many 
quarrels, but let us say right now that, in the Western world—and very soon T. Mann 
will confirm it—the basis of this sort of intellectual exercise, which entails considering 
at the same time the argument and the counter-argument, that is, the lógos and the 
antilogía, is a typical practice in the Athenian schools of the Sophists—fifth century 
BC—leaders of the so called Greek enlightenment.  
 
     One of the radical oppositions between the Jesuitical theses of Naphta and those of 
the freemason and humanist Settembrini is the former’s defence of faith as the basis and 
vehicle of knowledge, i.e. of Saint Anselms’s phrase: «I believe, in order that I may 
understand (Ich glaube, damit ich erkenne
8
)» (396), which relegates the intellect to a 
secondary position. According to Naphta, the great schoolmen of the twelfth and 
thirteenth centuries firmly believed that what is false in theology cannot be true in 
philosophy and, in their turn, the theological texts conceived man as the centre of the 
divine creation, as the creature for whom the whole of nature had been designed. «He is 
the measure of all things, and his welfare and salvation is the sole and single criterion of 
truth (Er ist das Mass der Dinge und sein Heil das Kriterium der Wahrheit)», he says 
and, therefore, the target of every true theory about men’s and women’s destiny must be 
their salvation and not knowledge of natural sciences: «Why have we given the Platonic 
philosophy the preference over every other, if not because it has to do with knowledge 
of God, and not knowledge of nature?». It is essential, then, to define what is ethically 
harmful, to indicate the measure and, if we fulfil this duty, we shall realise that: «It is a 
                                                                                                                                                                          
implicit classical references in the novel, although, needless to say, with regard to the latter ones, I should 
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childish to accuse the Church of having defended darkness rather than light (die 
Finsternis gegen das Licht)... it is this unconditioned, this a-philosophical natural 
science that always has led and ever will lead men into darkness» (397). This last 
assertion obliges me to consider that Plato and probably the role played by his image of 
the cave in order to visualise the philosophical salvation of souls—their reaching the 
intelligible region—must be added to the list of classical sources—we shall see it very 
soon—, although I must first mention the unquestionable previous reference to 
Protagoras, who has been adapted by Naphta’s words in a skilful and Christian way. 
Indeed, what do we read in the texts we have got?:   
 
. The Greeks say, and Protagoras was the first, that a reasoning can be opposed to any 
other
9
.  
. Protagoras declares that one can take either side on many questions and debate it with 
equal success –even on this very question, whether every subject can be debated from 
either point of view
10
.  
. Protagoras asserts that “Man is the measure of all things, of things that are that they are, 
and of things that are not, that they are not”; and by “measure” he means the criterion of 
truth, and by “things” (physical objects), so what he is really claiming is that “Man is the 
criterion of all objects, of those which are, that they are, and those which are not, that they 
are not. And in consequence of this he postulates only what appears (ta phainomena) to 
each individual, and thus he introduces relativity (to pros ti)”11. 
 
     Needless to say, Naphta’s skilfulness is that of Mann, who has had Settembrini’s 
metaphysical opponent pronounce not just any sentence—such as one that is alien to the 
freemason’s ideology—but the most humanistic, the one which would in principle suit 
the Italian master’s beliefs, thus demonstrating that Naphta also knows how to take 
advantage of Protagoras’s wisdom, that is, considering man as the ‘measure and 
criterion’. This is in the end an intelligent strategy because, later on, Settembrini 
admonishes Hans Castorp, claiming the support of the same Greek sophist: «Have 
respect… for your humanity, Engineer! Confide in your God-given power of clear 
thought, and hold in abhorrence these luxations of the brain, these miasmas of the 
spirit!». Man, he went on to say, «was the measure of things (Der Mensch sei das Mass 
der Dinge)» and, being aware that, in a similarly partial manner, Naphta strives to shape 
the young man’s mind, he will allude to the book of Genesis in order to defend the 
inalienable human right «to distinguish between good and evil (Gut und Böse)», to 
distinguish «reality and counterfeit (Wahrheit und Lügenschein)». Plain and simple: 
Settembrini also knows how to take advantage of biblical wisdom, thus making the 
‘creature’—who has now become ‘measure and criterion’—share with God His 
prerogative: the knowledge of good and evil, as it is quite clear from his new 
                                                          
9
 The translation is mine following the edition by Stählin et alii, 1970: ῞Ελληνές φασι Πρωταγόρου 
προκατάρξαντος παντὶ λόγῳ λόγον ἀντικεῖσθαι –Clem. Al. Strom. 6, 65.  
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πραγμάτων, ὡς δυνάμει φάσκειν πάντων πραγμάτων κριτήριον εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, τῶν μὲν ὄντων 
ὡς ἔστιν, τῶν δὲ οὐκ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τίθησι τὰ φαινόμενα ἑκάστῳ μόνα, καὶ οὕτως 
εἰσάγει τὸ πρός τι –S. E. P. 1, 216-219 (Mutschmann 1912; translated by Dillon & Gergel 2003). See 
also: Pl. Cra. 385e, 6-386a, 2: “(Socrates): … as Protagoras told: man is the measure of all things; things 
are to me as they appear to me and are to you as they appear to you” (ὥσπερ Προταγόρας ἔλεγεν λέγων 
“πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον” εἶναι ἄνθρωπον ὡς ἄρ’ οἷα μὲν ἄν ἐμοὶ φαίνεται τὰ πράγματα (εἶναι) 
τοιαῦτα μὲν ἔστιν ἐμοí· οἶα δ’ἂν σοί, τοιαῦτα δὲ σοί (Burnet 1900, rpr. 1977, the translation is mine).  
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admonition: «woe to them who dared to lead him astray in his belief in this creative 
right. Better for them that a millstone be hanged about their necks and that they be 
drowned in the depth of the sea» (667). 
 
     As is well-known, there are many Platonic texts that encourage men and women to 
prefer the knowledge of God to that of natural sciences, thus urging them to both 
abandon the physical world and to ascend towards the intelligible one. Let us read, for 
instance, the following reflection of Socrates’ in the Theaetetus (176a, 5-8, 176b, 1), 
which has the additional advantage of dealing with the quarrel between good and evil:   
 
But it is impossible that evils should be done away with, Theodorus, for there must 
always be something opposed to the good; and they cannot have their place among the 
gods, but must inevitably hover about mortal nature and this earth. Therefore, we ought to 
try to escape from earth to the dwelling of the gods as quickly as we can
12
.  
 
     The opposition of ‘darkness and light’ is constant in the Bible, but Naphta associated 
it with Plato’s philosophy, which—as I mentioned and expect to be able to prove later 
on—leads me to the Platonic image of the cave. In this respect, we should remember 
that, in accordance with the great Athenian philosopher, the epistemological condition 
of those who have always lived in it as prisoners is certainly shocking, for the constant 
mere contemplation of shadows prevents them from seeing Reality
13
. However, the 
degree of knowledge of other human beings’, in principle free as a result of not having 
lived in a cave-prison, is not higher; on the contrary, when a truly surprised Glaucon 
points out to Socrates: «A strange image you speak of… and strange prisoners», the 
Athenian master hastens to correct him: «Like to us» (Republic 515a, 4-5). This is 
indeed a strange and shocking image but:  
 
This image (ἐικόνα)... we must apply... likening the region revealed through sight to the 
habitation of the prison, and the light of the fire in it to the power of the sun. And if you 
assume that the ascent and the contemplation of the things above (τὴν δὲ ἄνω ἀνάβασιν 
καὶ θέαν τῶν ἄνω) is the soul’s ascension to the intelligible (τὴν εἰς τὸν νοητὸν τόπον 
τῆς ψυχῆς ἄνοδον τιθεὶς), you will not miss my surmise, since that is what you desire... 
my dream as it appears to me is that in the region of the known the last thing to be seen 
and hardly seen is the idea of good (ἐν τῷ γνωστῷ τελευταία ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα καὶ 
μόγις ὁρᾶσθαι), and that when seen it must needs point us to the conclusion that this is 
indeed the cause for all things of all that is right and beautiful, giving birth in the visible 
world to light, and the author of light and itself in the intelligible world being the 
authentic source of truth and reason, and that anyone who is to act wisely in private or 
public must have caught sight of this (517a, 8-517c, 5)
14
.  
 
     Consequently, unlike what we might logically think, from a Platonic point of view 
we certainly live in a prison, our souls should leave it behind as soon as possible, and 
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the knowledge of the Idea of Good demands from us a constant and supreme effort. 
Nevertheless, the goal of the ‘ideocentric’ ascent of a Platonic man is the summit of the 
unchangeable and everlasting Ideas, i.e., the Idea of the Beauty-Good or, so to speak, 
the summit of the Magic Mountain par excellence, whereas the end of the Hans 
Castorp’s unexpected experience in the mountain of wonders, Zauberberg, will be his 
descent to the physical or visible world, which, moreover, is engaged at that time in a 
terrible world war. The young engineer is supposed to have good reasons to make such 
a final decision but, for the time being and in a clear reference to Plato’s text that Mann 
clearly has in mind, I hasten to point out that, when the novel is about to end and the 
news on the historic thunder of the First World War arrives at the sanatorium, Hans 
Castorp still remains quite absent, dreaming and ruling
15
 doomed to confuse platonico 
more—that is, like the prisoners in the cave—the shadows they see with the reality: 
«preoccupied... but the things themselves he had heeded not at all (Hans Castorp), 
having a wilful tendency to take the shadow for the substance, and in the substance to 
see only shadow (709) (die Schatten für dir Dinge zu nehmen, in diesen aber nur 
Schatten zu sehen)».  
 
     I will now examine the dual view (lógos and antilogía) of humanism in The Magic 
Mountain, in which the classical notions also play a significant role. Settembrini 
chooses to give the young engineer an exhaustive and categorical definition: humanism 
is «love of human kind»; «political activity»; «rebellion against all that tended to defile 
or degrade our conception of humanity»; defence of the «right of the human being to his 
earthly interests, to liberty of thought and joy of life»
16
 (156) in striking contrast to «the 
superstitious hostility to the human spirit» and the «shameful formlessness» of the 
Middle Ages
17
, etc. From his point of view, Prometheus, «the earliest humanist (der 
erste Humanist)» (156), embodies all these values, inasmuch as he modelled with clay 
the first human beings and, above all, gave them the seeds of fire they needed, although 
later on he was severely punished by Zeus until Hercules interceded for him. With 
regard to this subject, then, Mann has just searched for the suitable tale (mythos) within 
the great mythical patrimony of the Greeks in order to allow us to understand his 
humanistic programme
18
.  
     At any rate, Settembrini asserts that humanism, human dignity and politics are 
always associated with beautiful words, «for the beautiful word begets the beautiful 
deed (das schöne Wort erzeuge die schöne Tat)… a good style would lead to good 
deeds... writing well was almost the same as thinking well, and thinking well was the 
next thing to acting well» (157). Here is the process that, in accordance with the Italian 
master, goes from beautiful words to good deeds and, everything seems to point that, in 
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 Which is already a usual habit: «This first visit of the cousins to Naphta… was followed by two or 
three others… All of them afforded young Hans Castorp much food for thought, when, in his blue-
blossoming retreat, with the image of the human form divine, called Homo Dei, hovering before his 
mind’s eye, he sat and ‘took stock’» (412).  
16
 On humanism and political philosophy in Thomas Mann’s works, see, e.g.: Pikulik 2013; Richard 
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 He also uses the Greek mythology in order to compare Hans Castorp’s personal situation when he 
arrives at the sanatorium: (Settembrini) «Then you are not one of us? You are well, you are but a guest 
here, like Odysseus in the kingdom of the shades (wie Odysseus im Schattenreich)? You are bold indeed, 
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health: «... two steps forward and three back. When you have been sitting here five months, along comes 
the old man and tucks on another six. It is like the torment of Tantalus: you shove and shove, and think 
you are getting to the top (Ach, es sind Tantalusquallen. Man schiebt und schiebt, und glaubt man, oben 
zu sein)» (148).  
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order to describe it, Mann comes back once again to philosophical sources such as 
Plato’s Symposium. In effect, the German novelist substantially reproduces the 
abstraction process that Diotima explains to Socrates, thanks to which the lover of one 
body realises that all individual beauties refer to a single archetypal Beauty; «he prefers 
then his beloved’s soul to his body, is truly interested in him and gives voice to the 
words that will make him better, thus being constrained to contemplate the beautiful as 
appearing in our observances and laws (τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιτηδεύμασι καὶ τοῖς νόμοις 
καλὸν -210c, 3-4)». However, the process has not yet ended but, after the observances 
and laws, the lover must lead his beloved to the beauty of sciences (ἐπί τὰς ἐπιστήμας 
ἀγαγεῖν -210c, 6-7), so that he will no longer be a worthless man but, «turning rather 
towards the main ocean of the beautiful may by contemplation of this bring forth in all 
their splendours fair fruits of discourse and meditation in a plenteous crop of 
philosophy... until... he descries a certain single knowledge... (τινὰ ἐπιστήμην μίαν 
τοιαύτην -210d, 4-7 –Lamb, 1983, in all the cases)»19.  
     There must be few passages like this in the Symposium that emphasize in such a 
clear way both Socrates and Plato’s conviction that any noble deed is the result of a 
beautiful word—itself resulting from the contemplation of beauty—when it gives rise to 
a discourse or lógos that, due to its aetiology, cannot but respect the forms, the forms of 
beauty, true guarantee of a like result regarding the deeds, that is to say, a guarantee of 
honesty and moral perfection.    
     Hans Castorp very soon espouses this ardent admiration of the word and beautiful 
forms. Having a talk with the Hofrat Behrens, he states that all the humanistic 
professions, whether they deal with the care of the human body or the soul: medicine, 
jurisprudence, philology, pedagogy, theology, etc. cannot be conceived without the 
support of the word and, moreover, «if you go in for them you have to study the ancient 
languages (die alten Sprachen) by way of foundation… and I find wonderful… that the 
formal, the idea of beautiful form… It gives such nobility… and courtliness» (258). 
Mann seems to pay homage here to the Greek and Latin roots of both the grammar and 
the humanistic and scientific lexicon of Western culture, but the true praise is reserved 
for the restorers of the classical world, the Renaissance humanists, who practiced «a 
certain lordly luxuriance, the generosità which displayed itself in ascribing to form a 
human value independent of its content – the cult of speech as an art for art’s sake (der 
Kultus der Rede als einer Kunst um der Kunst willen)». This was indeed the heritage of 
the Greek and Latin civilization that the humanists, «the uomini letterati, had restored... 
to the Romance nations, and which was the source of every later significant idealism, 
even political» (522). And from these assertions Mann turns directly—always through 
Settembrini—to the sanctification of literature20, i.e., «the miraculous conjunction of 
analysis and form»:  
 
... literature… its spirit… This it was that awakened the understanding of all things 
human, that operated to weaken and dissolve silly prejudices and convictions, that 
brought about the civilizing, elevating, and betterment of the human race… it preached 
honest doubt, fairness, tolerance. The purifying, healing influence of literature (Die 
                                                          
19
 We can read the sum of the process in 211b, 7-211d (Lamb 1983): «Such is the right approach or 
induction to love-matters. Beginning from obvious beauties he must for the sake of that highest beauty be 
ever climbing aloft, as on the rungs of a ladder, from one to two, and from two to all beautiful bodies; 
from personal beauty he proceeds to beautiful observances, from observance to beautiful learning, and 
from learning at last to that particular study which is concerned with the beautiful itself and that alone; so 
that in the end he comes to know the very essence of beauty».  
20
 About this, see, e.g.: Campillo 1995. 
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reinigende, heiligende Wirkung der Literatur), the dissipating of passions by knowledge 
and the written word, literature as the path to understanding, forgiveness and love… the 
writer as perfected type, as saint (524).  
  
     Nevertheless, being loyal both to himself and his sophistic design, Mann had taken 
care before to balance the two perspectives by making Naphta strongly protest against 
«the rhetorical and literary spirit (den rhetorisch-literarischen Geist) of the European 
educational system, and its splenetic partisanship of the formal and grammatical (seinen 
grammatisch-formalen Spleen), which was nothing else than an accessory to the 
interests of bourgeois class supremacy» (521)
21
. Naphta refers here to the unfortunate 
erudition peculiar to the popular training activities, whereas better results could be 
achieved by means of lectures, exhibitions, films, etc.
22
 However, regarding Naphta’s 
protest, many contemporary Western citizens would undoubtedly recall the classical 
languages, Greek and Latin, that they studied, whose teaching always emphasized 
grammar, form and the skilful use of erudite quotations, becoming in fact, as we have 
just read, a cult of speech as an art for art’s sake, independent of its content. And, 
needless to say, Naphta denies the sanctity of both literature and writers, because a man 
who like Settembrini does not accept the Absolute, that is, God or what is positive and 
certain, devotes himself to progress, to pure nihilism, and is «a traitor to life, before 
whose stern inquisition and Vehmgericht he deserved to be put to the question – and so 
forth (524-25)».  
 
     Naphta and Settembrini’s opposite visions of humanism would necessarily become 
quite clear from the latter’s logical claim regarding the dignity of the body in contrast to 
the former’s foreseeable condemnation, but Settembrini’s previous defence of intellect 
against that Saint Anselm’s phrase «I believe, in order that I may understand», 
proclaimed by Naphta, forces him now to undertake an exercise of coherence. Indeed, 
Settembrini states that he is more ill than Hans Castorp, that he hardly expects to 
recover and that he no longer travels in order to not prematurely weaken his body. 
However, he does so: «with the most stringent reservations; my spirit protested in pride 
and anguish against the dictates of my wretched body (meines armseligen Körpers)» 
(246). For his part, the young engineer thinks that being a humanist and despising the 
body at the same time is quite a contradiction, but the Italian master replies that he 
honours and loves the body as he honours the world and the interests of this life against 
«a sentimental withdrawal and negation—that is, classicism against romanticism—», 
but there is one higher and more powerful principle: the intellect. «... within the 
antithesis of body and mind, the body is evil, the devilish principle (das böse, das 
teuflische Prinzip), for the body is nature, and nature – within the sphere… of her 
antagonism to the mind… is evil» (247). Besides, one day «humanistic pride» will have 
to learn to feel as «a debasement and disgrace the fact that the intellect is bound up with 
                                                          
21
 An assertion that is obviously replied by Settembrini: «“You studied them”, Settembrini cried out… 
Your crude immaturity must go to school to the power which you would like to persuade yourself and 
others to despise; for without discipline you could not endure in the sight of man, and there is but one 
kind, that which you call the bourgeois, but which is in reality he human» (520).  
22
 Naphta even tells Settembrini that in Germany in the Middle Ages: «It had been thought blameworthy, 
in the Germany of that time, to send a boy to school unless he was to be a priest; and this popular-
aristocratic scorn of the literary arts was always the sign of fundamental nobility of soul… whereas the 
noble, the soldier, and the people never could, or barely – but he could do and understand nothing else in 
all the wide world, being nothing but a Latinistic windbag, who had power over language, but left life to 
people who were fit for it. Which was the reason why the literary person always conceived of politics as 
an empty bag of wind» (522). 
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the body and with nature», although he, unlike Christians, does not think that the body 
is evil: «Do you know that the great Plotinus is said to have made the remark that he 
was ashamed to have a body?»
23
 (247), he asks him, and adds that Voltaire rebelled 
against the brutal power of Nature, which by means of a terrible earthquake sacrificed 
thousands of human lives in Lisbon in the year 1775: 
 
We are to honour and uphold the body when it is a question of emancipation 
(Emanzipation), of beauty (Schönheit), of freedom of thought (Freiheit), of joy (Glück), 
of desire (Lust). We must despise it in so far as it sets itself up as the principle of gravity 
and inertia (Schwere / Schwere), when it obstructs the movement toward light (Bewegung 
zum Lichte); we must despise it in so far as it represents the principle of disease and death 
(Krankheit / Todes) (248-49).  
 
     If at the beginning of this analysis we observed that Settembrini substantially 
reproduced Plato’s texts and used them both intelligently and advantageously, now I 
would dare to say that, with regard to the central part of the previous paragraph, the 
spirit of the palinode in the Phaedrus (243e- 257b) might be certainly in its base—in 
fact, Mann explicitly quotes the Phaedrus in Death in Venice. Indeed, the fact that 
Settembrini does not consider the body as the principle of evil does not mean that he 
might not see himself as one of those souls that, after losing their wings, got hold of 
something solid (στερεοῦ τινος), settled down and become living creatures (ζῷον) with 
an earthly body (σῶμα γήϊνον), doomed to the mortal condition (θνητόν) (246c, 2-5). 
Therefore, we are all endowed with souls which, long time ago, could contemplate face 
to face the everlasting Ideas, «being ourselves pure and not entombed (ἀσήμαντοι < 
σῆμα) in this which we carry about with us and call the body (σῶμα)
24
..., in which we 
are imprisoned like an oyster in its shell» (250c 4-6). But being now prisoners in a cave 
of a shadowy ignorance—as we read above—and being also heavy creatures as a 
consequence of the material nature of our body, we must become winged again, for «the 
natural function of the wing is to soar upwards and carry that which is heavy (τὸ 
ἐμβριθὲς)» (246d, 6). If not, as Settembrini states, overwhelmed by «the principle of 
the gravity and inertia», we shall hardly move towards the light. Anyway, we shall be 
rescued by the anámnesis (ἀνάμνησις), that is, by the fact of remembering, for «every 
soul of man has by the law of nature beheld the realities (τὰ ὄντα), otherwise it would 
not have entered into a human being» (249e, 5-250). To sum up, the human intellect, a 
sort of skilful charioteer because of a memory that elevates it (aná), with the help of the 
wings that will grow up again as a result of a philosophical life, will never return to the 
darkness (εἰς... σκότον) but will experience a shining life (φανὸν βίον)
25
 (256d, 6-8 -
Fowler, 1913, in all the cases).  
 
     However, regarding the sources referred to concerning the primacy of the intellect, 
Mann makes Settembrini explicitly mention Plotinus, more Platonic than Plato—so to 
speak—father of that pyramidal system which places the Absolute indetermination or 
One—otherwise, it could not be named—at the summit of all the existing things, being 
totally alien to the physical world—though the latter depends on the former—and also 
                                                          
23
 See Porph. Plot, chapter I. (Henry-Schwyzer -1964-1977). See also: Clark 1996. 
24
 Cf. Pl. Cra. 400c.  
25
 A shining life thanks to the contemplation of the Beauty-Good; about this, see also Pl. Smp. 211d-212b. 
On the other hand and for obvious reasons, we must also bear in mind the Phaedo, where Socrates recites 
all the disadvantages caused by the union soul-body and the advantages of being purified from the latter; 
see, e.g.: 65b, 9-67d, 10.  
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an inexhaustible source from which everything comes. In other words, it is the highest 
Principle or the Light, towards which we must ascend, as Plotinus did, for the sake of a 
mystical union
26
. Needless to say, Hans Castorp will not imitate the father of 
Neoplatonism but he has received the extreme model, the most opposite pole to the 
material world
27
.  
      
     Settembrini had solemnly stated that the intellect is worthier than the body but, in the 
previous quotation also included a defence of the latter based upon the «freedom of 
thought, of joy, of desire». This last assertion is too vague to dare to bring to mind 
specific classical sources but, on the other hand, we cannot help remembering—very 
soon we shall see why—Epicurean texts such as the Letter to Menoeceus. Here are, for 
instance, two brief passages: the first compares the urge to philosophise throughout our 
lives with the ease with which we defend our constant search for happiness:  
 
Let no one either delay philosophizing when young, or weary of philosophizing when old. 
For no one is under-age or over-age for health on the soul. To say either that the time is 
not yet ripe for philosophizing, or that the time for philosophizing has gone by, is like 
saying that the time for happiness either has not arrived or is no more
28
. 
  
     In the second quotation advises us to be always ruled by pleasure and sensations: 
«We recognize pleasure as the good which is primary and congenital; from it we begin 
every choice and avoidance, and we come back to it, using the feeling as the yardstick 
for judging every good thing»
29
. My earlier attribution to this letter by Epicurus may 
have seemed hasty but, later on, when the novel focuses on Joachim’s serene attitude 
before death, we read the following reflections:  
 
It is a fact that a man’s dying is more the survivors’ affair than his own. Whether we 
quoted it well or not, the adage of the funny wise man has in any case full spiritual 
validity: So long as we are, death is not; and when death is present, we are not (solange 
wir sind, der Tod nicht ist, und dass, wenn der Tod ist, wir nicht sind). In other words, 
between death and us there is no rapport; it is something with which we have nothing to 
do – and only incidentally the world and nature (531).   
                                                          
26
 On the metaphysics of the One, see, e.g.: Bussanich 1996; and on the nature of the physical reality in 
Plotinus: Wagner 1996.  
27
 In effect, the One is totally undetermined (ἀοριστίαν παντελῆ –III 4,1, 5-17), incorporeal (μὴ σῶμα –
II 4,8,2), privation and lack of form (στέρεσις, οὐ μορφὴ –II 4, 14, 14-15). The matter it is still not (μὴ ὄν 
–II 5,4, 10-14), it is only a mirror which captures images (κάτοπτρον –IV 3,11, 7-8) but it takes no part in 
what it captures; even worse, it is an ornamented corpse (νεκρὸν κεκοσμημένον –II 4,5,18); it is an 
appearance (εἴδολον –II 5,5, 21-25). Given that it s privation and total lack (πενία παντελὴς –I 8,3, 16), 
it does not possess any good (μηδὲν παρ’ αὐτῆς ἀγαθὸν ἔχουσαν –I 8,3,36-37); it is absolute evil 
(αἰσχρὸν –II 4, 16, 24), the essential evil (τὸ ὄντως κακὸν –I 8,5,9); it lacks any sort of form (ἄμορφον –
I 6,2,13-16) and becomes constantly (γιγνόμενα ἀεί –II 4,5,27). For the soul, therefore, the arrival of 
matter means death. Human beings have no other option but to leave the material world or, at least, “this 
is the life which is peculiar to... happy and divine men: separation (ἀπαλλαγή) from the rest of things, 
escape (φυγή) of the one who is alone towards the One (VI 9,11,51)... in order to receive the One (VI 
7,34, 7-8)... and see the One (I 6,7,9. This is the true objective of the soul, that is, to possess that light, 
contemplate the one who is light in itself... leave it all (ἄφελε πάντα –V 3,17,38) –Armstrong 1966.   
28
 122: ὁ δὲ λέγων μήπω τοῦ φιλοσοφεῖν ὑπάρχειν ὥραν ἢ παρεληλυθέναι τὴν ὣραν ὅμοιος ἐστι τῷ 
λέγοντι πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν ἢ μὴ παρεῖναι τὴν ὥραν ἢ μηκέτι εἶναι –Usener 1887, rpr. 1963, 1966; 
translations by Long & Sedley 1990.  
29
 128-129: ταύτην (τὴν ἡδονήν) γὰρ ἀγαθὸν πρῶτον καὶ συγγενικὸν ἔγνωμεν, καὶ ἀπὸ ταύτης 
καταρχόμεθα πάσης αἱρέσεως καὶ φυγῆς καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτην καταντῶμεν ὡς κανόνι τῷ πάθει πᾶν 
ἀγαθὸν κρίνοντες.   
 10 
 
 
Here, then, are the words of Epicurus, the ancient adage in his Letter to Menoeceus:  
Therefore, that most frightful of evils, death, is nothing to us, seeing that when we exist 
death is not present, and when death is present we do not exist
30
. 
    The final theme of the previous quotation, which we have yet to analyze, is the 
defence of bodily emancipation and beauty, which leads to a new dialectical quarrel 
between Naphta and Settembrini. The former asks the young engineer to learn to 
appraise the artistic excellence of works such as the suffering Christ—XIV century—in 
his room. They are «works of art whose function it is to express the soul and the 
emotions... are always so ugly as to be beautiful, and so beautiful as to be ugly (hässlich 
vor Schönheit und schön vor Hässlichkeit)... Their beauty is not fleshly beauty, which is 
merely insipid – but the beauty of the spirit». They show both an inner and abstract 
beauty. Of his Christ, he comments: «It is very advanced Middle Ages—Gothic, signum 
mortificationis… It is the most utter and radical declaration of submission to suffering 
and the weakness of the flesh. Pessimistic and ascetic», and for further information he 
refers him to De miseria humanae conditionis by Innocent III—end of XII century 
(392-93).  
     In my opinion, it would be vain to recall that classical spirituality, even the most 
ascetic, which also despised the flesh, never discovered any sort of beauty in bodily 
ugliness, which certainly exists although it is rather unworthy of man
31
. Diotima, in 
Plato’s Symposium, explains to Socrates that it is the ‘contemplation of’ and the ‘contact 
with’ physical beauty, in addition to the beloved’s nobleness of character, that makes 
the good lover to bring forth the virtue with which he feels imbued
32
. And the stoics, 
two centuries later, still defined éros as «an impulse to make friendship caused by the 
appearance of beauty (ἐπιβολὴ φιλοποΐας διὰ κάλλος ἐμφαινόμενον)»33, although 
Plutarch
34
 gives us enough information to understand the real extent of this statement, 
thus bringing to our attention that physical beauty is by no means a conditio sine qua 
non. In fact, Hans Castorp, with regard to his room decoration, thinks that «a Greek 
Venus or athlete (eine griechische Venus oder so ein Athlet)... is probably at bottom the 
                                                          
30
 125: τὸ φρικοδέστατον οὖν τῶν κακῶν ὁ θάνατος οὐθὲν πρὸς ἡμας, ἐπειδή περ ὅταν μὲν ἡμεῖς 
ὧμεν, ὁ θάνατος οὐ πάρεστιν· ὅταν δ’ ὁ θάνατος παρῇ, τόθ’ ἡμεῖς οὐκ ἐσμέν. Οὔτε οὖν πρὸς τοὺς 
ζῶντας ἐστίν οὔτε πρὸς τοὺς τετελευτηκότας, ἐπειδή περὶ οὕς μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, οἱ δ’ οὐκέτι εἰσίν.   
31
 Certainly from another perspective, Socrates asks Alcibiades to compare his bodily beauty with the 
superior beauty of his knowledge but, in any case, there is no room for any exaltation of the physical 
ugliness: «For then what a stupendous beauty you must see in me, vastly superior to your comeliness!» 
(ἀμήχανόν τοι κάλλος ὁρῴης ἂν ἐν ἐμοὶ καὶ τῆς παρὰ σοὶ εὐμορφίας πάμπολυ διαφέρον –Smp., 218e, 
2-3 –Lamb 1983). 
32
 «So when a man’s soul is so far divine that it is made pregnant with these from his youth, and on 
attaining manhood immediately desires to bring forth and beget, he too... goes about seeking the beautiful 
object whereon he may do his begetting, since he will never beget upon the ugly. Hence it is the beautiful 
rather than the ugly bodies that he welcomes in his pregnancy, and if he chances also on a soul that is fair 
and noble and well-endowed, he gladly cherishes the two combined in one; and straightway in addressing 
such a person he is resourceful in discoursing of virtue and of what should be the good man’s character 
and what his pursuits; and so he takes in hand the other’s education. For I hold that by contact with the 
fair one (τοῦ καλοῦ), and by consorting with him he bears and brings forth his long-felt conception (ἃ 
πάλαι ἐκύει τίκτει καὶ γεννᾷ)» (209a, 8-c, 3 –Lamb 1983). 
33 Stob. Ecl. II, 91, 10. SVF III, 935.  
34
 Moralia 1073 B-C. See, e.g., the introduction, chapter VII of Gilabert 1999.  
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most humanistic of all the arts» (259)
35
. And Settembrini—referring now to a Pietà in 
Naphta’s room—also compares it with the classical artistic sensibility. «He 
characterized as absurd the formlessness to which the Middle Ages and all periods like 
them had been a prey»; he exalted, on the contrary, «the Graeco-Roman heritage, 
classicism (das griechisch-römische Erbe, den Klassizismus), form, and beauty, reason, 
the pagan joy of life. To these things and these alone… was it given to ameliorate man’s 
lot on earth» (394).  
      
     Humanism, therefore, has meant and still means the restoration of classicism, above 
all with regard to one of its essential features: the treatment of the forms that we have 
already seen materialised in beautiful words, whose beneficial consequence in their turn 
were good deeds. In accordance with this notion, Settembrini now asks Hans Castorp to 
be aware that exaltation of ugliness and formlessness inevitably leads to bad deeds or 
dehumanization, as is clearly seen from that murderous intolerance of the Inquisition—
that is to say, the infamous zeal in the persecution of everything threatening 
«supernatural domination» —and also the use of the sword and the stake «as 
instruments of human benevolence»
36
. Naphta, however, immediately recalls the 
appropriate counter-speech or antilogía and replies that the French National Convention 
«freed the world of undesirable citizens», thus evidencing the Jacobins’ mania for 
destruction», which, unlike all the pains of the Church—even the stake and the 
excommunication— was not meant to save “the soul from everlasting damnation”. In 
effect, the degradation of humanity is a consequence of «the bourgeois spirit», which is 
peculiar to the «Renaissance, age of enlightenment» and to «the natural sciences» like 
modern astronomy that shifted man from the centre of the universe and put «an end to 
the majestic cosmic position of man—upon which, moreover, all astrology bases itself» 
(395).  
     The classical basis of this speech—as cited above—is the adapted wisdom of 
Protagoras, father of man «as measure of all things», but thinking of his soul’s salvation 
as the true sole criterion. Nevertheless, from the perspective of the classical tradition, it 
is the classicism of the Scholastic philosophy that truly endows Naphta with the 
intellectual weapons he needs. Let us keep in mind, for instance, that both Platonism 
and Aristotelianism presume the antithesis of «God and world» and, as a consequence, 
that man’s being is dual. «The problem of his soul consists in the conflict between the 
spiritual and the material, to which all social problems are entirely secondary». Man 
was thus well protected against the infinite cosmos conceived by the Renaissance 
astronomers and also against the end of the antithesis of «God and nature», for in the 
bosom of the human personality there cannot be a struggle between two hostile 
principles—between the two horses of the chariot in the palinode of the Phaedrus, if we 
think of it Platonico modo—but man becomes «harmonious and unitary, the conflict 
subsists merely between his individual and his collective interests; and the will of the 
State becomes... the law of morality». Needless to say, Settembrini firmly disagrees 
                                                          
35
 Let us remember, for instance, how Hans Castorp appraises Joachim’s beautiful body: «Hans Castorp... 
absorbed in contemplation of his cousin’s torso. The ribs... rose under the taut skin as he took deep 
inhalations... studies that youthful figure, slender, yellowish-bronze, with a black fell along the breastbone 
and the powerful arms... ‘Those are the arms of an athlete’... look how he is developed, like a picture in a 
book, a regular Apollo Belvedere (Sieh an, er ist gewachsen, wie es im Buche steht, der reine Apollo von 
Belvedere)» (176).  
36
 «Herr Settembrini was afraid of ‘Absolute Spirit,’ and would like to see it everywhere wedded to 
democratic progress; he was simply outraged at the religious license of his militant opponent, which 
would jumble up together God and the Devil, sanctification and bad behavior, genius and disease, and 
which knew no standards of value, no rational judgment, no exercise of the will» (467). 
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and, against the false logic of his opponent, he asserts that «the achievements wrung 
from the past… by the renaissance and the intellectual revival are personality, freedom, 
and the rights of man» (398).    
 
     For the freemason, the terrible consequence of the «supernatural domination» 
mentioned above is the rejection of the amor carnalis and commodorum corporis (448), 
the love of the flesh and the dependence upon bodily comfort, just those things that 
demand that we pay due honour to health. For Naphta, on the contrary, this respect and 
reverence for the body could only be justified if it had remained in the «original 
sinlessness» and not in the actual state of degradation, statu degradationis. The reverse 
being the case, the body is mortal and corruptible, it is «the prison-house and torture-
chamber of the soul, or as the fit instrument for rousing the conscience to a sense of 
shame and confusion (pudoris et confusionis sensum), as Saint Ignatius had it»
37
. Hans 
Castorp, for his part, brings up now the information given by his master, that is, the fact 
that Plotinus was ashamed of his body, so that Settembrini does not know how to face 
up to his challenge and, taking an attitude unworthy of a good master, disqualifies his 
pupil warning him not to confuse what he is actually not confusing: «(He) ordered the 
young man not to confuse two different points of view – and, for the rest, to be advised 
and maintain an attitude of receptivity (rezeptiv)» (453).  
 
     Naphta is certainly not a pupil but a skilful opponent and polemicist who, therefore, 
dares to question Settembrini’s intellectual capacity. He reproaches him, for instance, 
for not wanting to understand «that ironic humanity which made constant concession to 
the world and the flesh», nor does he understand «the ecclesiastical conception of 
indulgence, under which was to be classified one of the sacraments of the Church— 
namely, marriage». In any case, the concession was «only a protection against sin, 
countenanced in order to set bounds to sensual desire». The question is, then: «the 
ascetic principle, the ideal of complete chastity, might be upheld, without at the same 
tome opposing an unpolitic harshness to the flesh?» (589). Settembrini’s antilogia is full 
of angry passion now:  
 
...no need of the pernicious indulgence it proffered, against the accused dualism of a 
conception which bedeviled the universe – that is to say, life – as well as life’s dark 
opposite, the Spirit – for if life was evil, the Spirit, as pure negation, must be so too. And 
he broke a lance in defence of the blamelessness of sensual gratification (die Unschuld 
der Wollust) (589).   
 
     Once more from the perspective of the classical tradition, it is worth underlining the 
ironic fact—and Mann is well aware of it—that a lover of classicism and apologist for 
the sensual gratification as is his Settembrini not only must face up to the centuries-old 
Christian ascetic tradition but also to the ascetic side of the classical sensibility. He took 
                                                          
37
 Naphta’s guidelines are: «Absolute authority, iron discipline, coercion, submission, the Terror!... It was 
the army regulations of the Prussian Frederick, the Exercise-book of the Spanish Loyola all over again; it 
was rigid, it was devout, to the very marrow» (466-67). The members of the Company of Jesus: «For 
theirs was a work of supererogation (ex supererogatione) in that they not only combated the rebellion of 
the flesh (rebellio carnis), which after all was incumbent upon any average healthy human reason to do, 
but were hostile to even an inclination toward the things of the sense, toward love of self and love of 
worldly things, even where these had not been directly forbidden. For it was better and more honourable 
to assail the foe (agere contra), that is, to attack, than merely to defend oneself (resistere). To weaken and 
break the foe – those were the instructions in the service-book; and here again its author, the Spanish 
Loyola, was of one mind with Joachim’s captain general, the Prussian Frederick, with his motto of 
‘Attack, attack! Keep on their heels! Attaquez donc toujours!’» (447).   
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Plotinus as an example but the implicit echo of Platonic texts, of which—as seen 
above—he often and skilfully takes advantage, is certainly plausible. The palinode in 
the Phaedrus, is full of arguments against the bad lover who does not avoid the sensible 
world in order to reach the intelligible one. On the contrary, surrendered to the sensual 
gratification that derives from the contemplation of the earthly beauty, «like a beast he 
proceeds to lust and begetting (τετράποδος νόμον βαίνειν ἐπιχειρεῖ καὶ 
παιδοσπορεῖν), he makes licence his companion and is not afraid or ashamed to pursue 
pleasure in violation of nature (οὐ δέδοικεν οὐδ' αἰσχύνεται παρὰ φύσιν ἡδονὴν 
διώκων)» (250e, 3-4, 251). The contrast to this attitude is provided by those men who, 
as Aristophanes states in the Symposium, come from an ancient dual masculine genre 
and, after becoming pederasts as a consequence (παιδεραστοῦσι), «have no natural 
(φύσει) interest in wiving and getting children (πρὸς γάμους καὶ παιδοποίας), but 
only do these things under stress of custom (ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου); they are quite contented 
to live together unwedded» (ἀγάμοις -191e, 6-192b, 2). At any rate, the great master of 
the Platonic erotic asceticism is Diotima, who explains to Socrates (211d-212a) what we 
could call the fine concept of intellectual begetting in contrast to the biological act, 
precisely the final stop of those who have rightly ascended towards the intelligible 
world and can already contemplate «the very essence of beauty (αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν)». This 
can be compared with nothing, not even with «your beautiful boys... whose aspect now 
so astounds you» (211d, 2-5)
38
.     
      
     Consequently, it is quite obvious that, in accordance with Mann’s design, the ugly 
pole of the confrontation between those who rightly consider themselves humanists and 
those who in fact must prove they really are is assigned to Naphta. He thinks that 
disease is very human and that saints have always lived off its fruits. Settembrini states 
that it is stupid to exalt this and considers it «criminoso» to abjure health and life. 
Naphta is not for abolishing bodily punishments and defends holy cruelty to enforce 
obedience; with regard to the Inquisition, he is for the torture: «The torture was 
recommended to reason (vernunftgeboten)» to look into the heart and the brain of those 
who do not tell the truth. Settembrini thinks it a «porcheria» and «a madness of 
asceticism (Asketischer Irrwahn)». Naphta is for the capital punishment because he does 
not believe in the scientific determinism, based upon which the freemason rejects the 
conception of guilt and also because: «It is absurd for the murderer to outlive the 
murdered». Settembrini, on the contrary, is for abolishing it, thinking of the «ever-
present possibility that justice might err and judicial murder be committed» and of the 
urge not to repay evil with evil. Naphta is not for the «destruction of the body by fire». 
Settembrini is. To sum up, Naphta attacks «the liberal-individualism of our bourgeois, 
humanitarian age (Liberal-Individualismus der bürgerlichen Humanitätsepoche)»; the 
«enlightened absolutism of the ego (Absolutismus des Ich)»; the reluctance to go 
                                                          
38
 Platonic references to be taken into account in my opinion because, when Clavdia Chauchat leaves the 
sanatorium, Hans Castorp realizes, as tradition prescribes –also the classical one- that he had forgotten 
everything but her. Let us compare, then, Mann and Plato’s texts and we shall see that mutatis mutandis 
they assert almost the same: «I no longer know precisely how long. I have forgotten, broken with, 
everything, my relatives, my calling, all my ideas of life. When Clavdia went away, I waited here for her 
return, so that now I am wholly lost to life down below, and dead in the eyes of my friends» (611). Phdr. 
252a 1-7 (Burnet 1901, rpr. 1991): «Therefore the soul will not, if it can help it, be left alone by the 
beautiful one, but esteems him above all others, forgets for him mother and brothers and all friends, 
neglects properly and cares not for its loss, and despising all the customs and proprieties in which it 
formerly took pride, it is ready to be a slave and to sleep wherever it is allowed, as near as possible to the 
beloved».  
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“beyond considerations of personal safety and well being” in order to accept 
«something beyond personal or individual interests (etwas Überpersönliches, 
Überindividuelles)», and finally he deplores the lack of heroism of the utilitarian 
morality, whose «end and aim was to make men grow old and happy, rich and 
comfortable—and that was all there was to it (dass man alt und glücklich, reich und 
gesund damit werde und damit Punktum)» (456-68).  
     It would be impossible indeed to capture the beauty of this pure and ultimate 
ugliness, but we should not forget that opposition to the bourgeois style of life—above 
all artists’ life—is a recurrent topic in Mann’s works, and that the young engineer will 
finally descend to the plain to take part in a war, an act which is truly alien to personal 
or individual interests. We might somehow assert, then, that the beautiful pole will have 
to approach towards the ugly one. In other words, our analysis of the use of the sophist 
technique of considering the lógos / antilogía throughout the novel reasonably takes us 
to the opposition itself, although, regarding this theme, I clearly enter the ground of 
hypotheses, that is to say, the maybe implicit but not explicit reference that, however, I 
shall approach forcing me to substantiate its credibility as far as possible.  
     The tuberculosis sanatorium, where the protagonists of the novel reside, is by 
definition a place of suffering people
39
, who necessarily witness their companions’ 
death and try to accept it as positively as they can. According to Settembrini’s thesis: 
«the only sane, noble... the only religious way to think of death is as part and parcel of 
life; to regard it... as the inviolable condition of life (als heilige Bedingung des 
Lebens)». He appeals to the wisdom of the ancients: «The ancients adorned their 
sarcophagi with the emblems of life and procreation... These men knew how to pay 
homage to death. For death is worthy of homage, as the cradle of life, as the womb of 
palingenesis (Der Tod ist ehrwürdig als Wiege des Lebens, als Mutterschoss der 
Erneuerung)» (198). He even remembers that the first time he and the young engineer 
approached serious themes: «We spoke, I believe, of life and death (von Tod und 
Leben)... and the grotesqueness into which it declines so soon as the mind erects it into 
an independent principle» (411). In effect: «Either the experience of death must be the 
last experience of life, or else it must be a bugaboo, pure and simple (Das Erlebnis des 
Todes muss zuletzt das Erlebnis des Lebens sein)» (457). These reflections are wise and 
convincing enough to be assumed by his pupil and, later on, Hans Castorp remembers 
them walking through the mountain and facing up to a terrible snowstorm: «...he who 
knows the body, life, knows death (Wer aber den Körper, das Leben erkennt, erkennt 
den Tod).... And that is… only the beginning. One must have… the other side (das 
Gegenteil). For all interest in disease and death is only another expression of interest in 
life» (495). He is so convinced of such an undeniable truth that he hastens to share it 
with Clavdia Chauchat: «...love of it (death) leads to love of life and love of humanity… 
and I am enchanted… to tell you all about it. There are two paths to life: one is the 
regular one… The other is bad, it leads through death – that is the spirituel way»40 (596-
97).  
     Indeed, it was Heraclitus who, among the Presocratic philosophers, proposed to 
understand the Nature in terms of a cosmos or universal order and harmony
41
 
paradoxically made of a permanent opposition of contraries. The philosopher’s 
                                                          
39
 About this, see, e.g.: Max 2013; Engelhardt 2003. 
40
 On death in Thomas Mann’s works, see, e.g.: La Vergata 2003; Meredith 1999; Heftrich 1993; Scholdt 
1980.  
41 «Heraclitus says that what is opposite agrees and from what does not agree comes the most beautiful 
harmony, and everything happens according to discord» (Ἡ. τὸ ἀντίξουν συμφέρον καὶ ἐκ τῶν 
διαφερόντων καλλίστην ἁρμονίαν καὶ πάντα κατ’ ἔριν γίνεσθαι  (Arist. EN. Θ 2. 1155 b 4. B 8 DK).  
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fragments that we could take into account simply as a general reference –hypothetical, I 
insist- of the reflections we have just read
42
 are the following: first, the one asserting the 
‘life / death’ opposition and the transformation of the former into the latter and vice 
versa: «As only one thing there is life and death, to be awake and to be asleep, youth 
and age, for these become those and those again these»
43
; secondly, the one that points 
out that we need disease to understand health: «Disease makes health pleasant and good, 
hunger satiety, weariness rest»
44
. It is quite obvious that, only by remembering all that 
has been analyzed so far, one should recognize that Mann has a good knowledge of the 
Greek philosophy. And, with regard to Heraclitus, we could even remember that in 
1901—Mann began to write The Magic Mountain in 1913—Hermann Diels published 
Herakleitos von Ephesos, with a German translation of the fragments but, in any case, 
we cannot affirm that this title was one of the books in Mann’s personal library45. On 
the contrary, there are some studies that do relate Heraclitus to Mann’s works, although 
his influence would arrive at him indirectly, that is, through the presence of Heraclitus’s 
thoughts in the works by Jung or Nietzsche, to whom Mann is intellectually much 
indebted
46
.   
     At any rate, the opposites—having Heraclitus in mind or not47—are poles creating 
permanent tension, movement and change, and regarding the Greek philosopher the key 
words are “war” and “flow”48. In fact Naphta reproaches Settembrini for urging Hans 
Castorp to move, to rebel: «...Herr Settembrini spoke... with great enthusiasm, of the 
revolutionary principle (Bewegung) and about rebellion and reform (Rebellion, 
                                                          
42
 That is to say, the fragments which, in addition to others, serve to form the general thought of a 
philosopher as he/she is explained in any history of Greek philosophy.  
43 ταὐτό τ’ἔνι ζῶν καὶ τεθνηκὸς καὶ τὸ ἐγρηγορὸς καὶ καθεῦδον καὶ νέον καὶ γηραιόν· τάδε γὰρ 
μεταπεσόντα ἐκεῖνα ἐστι κἀκεῖνα πάλιν μεταπεσόντα ταῦτα (Plu. Consol. ad. Apoll. 106e. B 88 DK –
the translations are mine).  
44
 νοῦσος ὑγιείην ἡδὺ καὶ ἀγαθόν, λιμὸς κόρον, κάματος ἀνάπαυσιν (Stob. Flor. III, 177. B 111 DK). 
45
 Nor can it be categorically denied; in fact, after contacting with ETHBIB Thomas-Man-Archive in 
Zürich the answer was: «it is not existing in Thomas Mann’s own library as she is standing here today. 
This did not say that he never owned the book, it could be lost during the exile».    
46
 Nolte 1996, p. 30, for instance, writes with regard to Thomas Mann’s Joseph Novels: «The novel 
contains numerous symbols, motifs and themes, of which the central ones appear in pairs of opposites... 
Through this dialectic structure is constituted the central and all-embracing theme of being and meaning, 
which informs this whole range of opposed symbols. Heraclitus speaks in his philosophy of the dialectical 
law of enantiodromia... ‘the process by which something becomes its opposite, and the subsequent 
interaction of the two’. Jung uses the term for the emergence of the unconscious opposite in the course of 
time’ », and she adds the following reference: C. G. Jung. Collected Works, 6, translated by H. G. Baynes 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974, p.246). Or regarding other Heraclitus’s notions in 
Bekenntnisse des Hochstaplers Felix Krull, Montiel 2013, proposing to read the novel from the new 
conception of the human psyché opened by Jung and continued by the Imaginal Psychology of James 
Hillman, writes the following: «From the first moment the self is a problem for Felix Krull and more than 
this the result of an erroneous idea about what human life is. It is not difficult to see here the mark of 
“everything flows” in the words of Heraclitus, undoubtedly the pre-Socratic philosopher most admired by 
Hillman and also by Nietzsche». Finally and regarding Nietzsche’s admiration of Heraclitus, here are, for 
instance, two excerpts of The Birth of Tragedy (Nietzsche 2000, pp. 107 and 129): «… It is precisely 
music which is the sole unadulterated, pure, and purifying fire-spirit, out of which and into which, as in 
the doctrine of the great Heraclitus of Ephesus, all things move in a double cycle»; «…a Dionysian 
phenomenon, which reveals to us again and again the playful construction and destruction of the 
individual world as the overflow of an original joy, in a similar way to that in which Heraclitus the 
Obscure compares the world-forming force to a child at play, arranging and scattering stone here and 
there, building and then trampling sand-hills».    
47
 Needless to say, I cannot discard Hegel’s system of contraries. However, it is highly significant that, 
when “das Gegenteil” and all Hegel’s related terms are examined, Heraclitus is immediately quoted; see, 
e.g.: Inwood 1992, 205-206.   
48
 «War is father of everything» (πόλεμος πάντῶν μὲν πατὴρ ἐστί  -Hippol. Haer. IX, 9, 4. B 53 DK). 
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Weltverbesserung), which is no very peaceful principle (kein... friedliches Prinzip)». 
Besides: «You see… life developing from infusorium up to man (Sie sehen in 
ungemessenen Zeiträumen das Leben)... man has yet before him endless possibilities of 
development?» (380-81).  
 
     Having Heraclitus in mind or not, one can acknowledge that the young protagonist’s 
humanistic education has largely consisted of witnessing a constant war between 
opposites, and that everything seems to point towards Mann wanting him to save them 
from mutual destruction, thus becoming in his turn the harmonic and unifying element: 
«They forced everything to an issue... and wrangled bitterly over extremes, whereas it 
seemed to him... as though somewhere between two intolerable positions (irgendwo 
inmitten zwischen den strittigen Unleidlichkeiten)... must lie something (conciliatory – 
versöhnlich), which one might personally call the human» (523). Therefore, the role to 
play by the engineer, the role to play by any human being finally endowed with a 
personal criterion is to become the sole and unifying Reason— Lógos—, thanks to 
which the permanent war between pairs of opposites becomes a true salvation and not a 
tragic step towards the abyss of mutual destruction. Thomas Mann, then, presents here 
the most humanistic version not only of the war between opposing forces but also of the 
nuclear concept or Lógos that conciliates them. In other words, man’s kingdom is full of 
contradictions but they are the subjects of the higher King’s dignity, intelligence and 
piety:  
 
I have learned much from those up here, I have been driven up from the valley, so that the 
breath almost left my poor body. Yet now from the base of my column I have no meager 
view. I have dreamed of man’s state… I will hold with them and not with Naphta, neither 
with Settembrini. They are both talkers… Pedagogues both! 49 Their quarrels and counter-
positions are just a guazzabuglio too, and a confused noise of battle, which need trouble 
nobody who keeps a little clear in his head and pious in his heart… Disease, health! 
Spirit, nature! (Tod oder Leben – Krankheit, Gesundheit – Geist und Natur). Are those 
contradictions?... The recklessness of death is in life, it would not be life without it – and 
in the centre (in der Mitte) is the position of the Homo Dei… I, from my column, perceive 
all this. In this state he must live gallantly, associate in friendly reverence with himself, 
for only he is aristocratic, and the counter-positions are not at all. Man is the lord of 
counter-positions (Der Mensch ist Herr der Gegensätze), they can be only through him, 
and thus he is more aristocratic than they (ist er vornehmer als sie). More so than death, 
too aristocratic for death – that is the freedom of his mind. More aristocratic than life, too 
aristocratic for life, and that is the piety in his heart (495-96).    
 
     Here is the final conviction of a young man who has learnt that life is movement, 
change, tension and war, and who is intellectually powerful enough to rule his life and, 
yet, he has not transformed this power into an excuse to remain protected in a sort of 
ivory tower. On the contrary, long ago he had already felt overwhelmed by the peace 
and comfort of the sanatorium to the extent of foreseeing the paralysis of his spirit: «He 
had sat there and looked abroad, at those mist-wreathed summits, at the carnival of 
snow, and blushed to be gaping thus from the breast-work of material well-being (und 
sich seines Gaffens über die Brustwehr des Komforts hin in seiner Seele geschämt)» 
                                                          
49
 Pedagogues with no connexion with the world: «... when the scene changed from the sphere of the 
intellectual to the strictly earthly and practical, and dealt with questions, and in fields, where commanding 
natures prove their worth – then there were no two views possible. For then the others were undone, then 
they were cast in the shade, then they drew in their horns, and Peeperkorn came out, grasped the sceptre, 
arranged, decided, ‘settled’» (591). 
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(477). He had felt the lack of something and because of this lack caused his «(desire) 
was a lively craving to come into close and freer touch with the mountains… in their 
snowy desolation... Yet how could he, all unprovided and foot bound as he was, hope to 
gratify such a desire?». It was not any desire but «the fascination of venturing just so far 
into the monstrous unknown… that the adventure grazed the perilous, that it was just 
barely possible to put limits to it». He faced up, then, to the mountain: «... powdered in 
snow to the waist, up a succession of snow-shrouded terraces, up and up... higher and 
higher toward the sky». And danger made its appearance: «...not remarking an 
intervening depression of the ground… everything swam before his eyes in the white 
mist… if he were overtaken unawares by the storm, he would probably… not find his 
way home». Prudence counselled him to return to the sanatorium but «he refused to take 
premature flight… what went on in Hans Castorp’s soul can only be described by the 
one word challenge (Herausforderung)... a repudiation of all caution whatsoever» (481). 
His heart «was stormly beating»; he did not want to let himself «be snowed under by 
this idiotically symmetrical crystallometry», so that he fought and resisted the 
temptation to lie down but  «he did his part, and moved on despite the weight the cold 
more and more laid upon his limbs» (472-85).  
     Therefore, there is no doubt that the absolute bourgeois idolatry of the ego, which 
was censured by Naphta and leads man to avoid any risk, has not taken root in the 
young engineer. We have seen him overcoming the opposite elements and becoming the 
reason or lógos that conciliates them. Anyway, in his present circumstances, reason 
might counsel him to give finally way to death, so that Thomas Mann provides him with 
the first pole of a constant opposition in his works: ‘Liebe / Tod’, ‘éros / thánatos’, the 
instinct to preserve life and the instinct to search for death, just as Freud puts it, for 
example, in The Ego and the Id (Das Ich und das Es, 1923)
50
: «I will be good. I will let 
death have no mastery over my thoughts. For therein lies goodness and love of 
humankind». He does not reject Death’s authority but: «Death and love… Love (die 
Liebe: love, affection, esteem) stands opposed to death. It is love, not reason (Vernunft: 
reason, sanity, common sense), that is stronger than death». And, if we have seen above 
that the beauty of form, materialised in the beauty of the word, led to good deeds, it is 
quite logical now to see form being equated to love and goodness, thus accomplishing a 
noble humanistic project: «And from love and sweetness alone can form come: form 
and civilization, friendly, enlightened, beautiful human intercourse». To sum up, Hans 
Castorp’s formative period, that is, his ability of thinking and ruling accordingly has 
finally and happily concluded:  
 
… yes it is well and truly dreamed… I will keep faith with death in my heart, yet well 
remember that faith with death and the dead is evil, is hostile to humankind, so soon as 
we give it power over thought and action. For the sake of goodness and love, man shall 
let death have no sovereignty over his thoughts (Der Mensch soll um der Güte und Liebe 
willen dem Tode keine Herrschaft einräumen über seine Gedanken)… … Long, long have 
I sought after this word… Now I have it fast… I am in simple raptures, my body is warm, 
my heart beats high… humanly, on grounds of my joyful spirits… Up, up! Open your 
eyes! These are your limbs, your legs here in the snow! Pull yourself together, and up!… 
He had a hard struggle to free himself – but the inner compulsion proved stronger. With a 
jerk he raised himself on his elbows, briskly drew up his knees, shoved, rolled, wrestled 
to his feet (496). 
 
                                                          
50
 About this, see e.g.: Berlin 1992; Northcote-Bade 1984; Wysling 1983.  
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     The lógos that had conciliated the poles, still too cold, has now become love injecting 
courage, power, happiness and passion. Love provides Hans Castorp—in fact, all 
human beings—with what they need to face up to their constant war or life. ‘Liebe’ 
does not mean here ‘the éros or desire of what we lack’ of Plato`s Symposium51—the 
young engineer has reached the end, so to speak, of the scala amoris—neither does it 
mean the healthy madness that lovers and beloveds receive from gods, as we read in the 
palinode of his Phaedrus
52
 but it is certainly enthusiasm and passion (erwärmt: 
enthusiastic, passionate).  
     Those hazards deriving from the snowstorm made him choose life and this is a well-
learnt lesson but, once again in the sanatorium and deprived of the demonic power that 
his love for Clavdia Chauchat injected in him, «all these events had put the young man 
in a frame of mind to find life itself not precisely canny... everything appeared... 
permanently and increasingly awry». The winner is now «a demonic power (Dämon)... 
the name was Dumps (Stumpfsinn)», that is, a dead life with no sensations and 
hardships that takes him back to an earlier state he had been ashamed of: «He saw on 
every side the uncanny and the malign... life without time, life without care or hope, life 
as... assiduous stagnation (das Leben als stagnierende betriebsame Liederlichkeit), life 
as dead (das tote Leben)» (627). And, after seven years, the thunderbolt of the Great 
War reaches the sanatorium. «He saw himself released, freed (Er sah sich entzaubert... 
befreit) from enchantment... by the operation of exteriors powers (elementaren 
Aussenmächten)» (711). As usual, he is comfortably lying on the grass but he must get 
up again and get out of his golden cave, well aware of having committed once more a 
sin of omission:  
 
Yet though his tiny destiny fainted to nothing in the face of the general, was there not 
some hint of a personal mercy and grace for him, a manifestation of divine goodness and 
justice? Would Life receive again her erring and ‘delicate’ child (Nahm das Leben sein 
sündiges Sorgenkind noch einmal an) – not by a cheap and easy slipping back to her 
arms, but sternly, solemnly, penitentially… He sank on his knees, raising face and hands 
to a heaven that howsoever dark and sulphurus was no longer the gloomy grotto of his 
state of sin (die Grottendecke des Sündenberges) (711-12).  
 
     We have reached, then, the most controversial episode of the novel, i.e., Hans 
Castorp’s final decision, after his formative period, to abandon his refuge and descend 
to the plain at such a tragic moment. The enchantment of his personal Zauberberg has 
definitively disappeared because, after seven years, the most severe version or pole of 
life, that is to say, the worldly tension turned into a war seems now to be strong enough   
to drag him. Having Heraclitus in mind or not, life is movement and flow and, 
consequently, is in a permanent tension with death; otherwise, it would become a 
contradictio in terminis: das tote Leben. The living life has faced Hans Castorp up to an 
inescapable dilemma: to surrender to the danger of stagnation and death while he is still 
alive, a real danger that besieges him again, or to let himself be dragged by the flow of 
the events towards an uncertain destiny after having been unduly driven up from the 
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 200e, 8-9: «First, is not Love directed to certain things; of which, in the second place, he has a want?» 
Socrates asks Agathon (ἔστιν ὁ ῎Ερως πρῶτον μὲν τινῶν, ἔπειτα τούτων ὧν ἂν ἔνδεια παρῇ αὐτῷ; -
Lamb 1983).  
52
 245b, 2-6: «... let us not be afraid on that point, and let no one disturb and frighten us by saying that the 
reasonable friend should be preferred to him who is in a frenzy (ὡς πρὸ τοῦ κεκινημένου τὸν σώφρονα 
δεῖ προαιρεῖσθαι φίλον). Let him show in addition that love is not sent from heaven for the advantage of 
lover and beloved alike, and we will grant him the prize of victory» (ἐπ' ὠφελίᾳ ὁ ἔρως τῷ ἐρῶντι καὶ τῷ 
ἐρωμένῳ ἐκ θεῶν ἐπιπέμπεται –Fowler 1913).  
 19 
 
valley. Between an assiduous stagnation and a tragic but dynamic disorder—as life very 
often is—the sinless choice clearly seems to be the second one53, although Mann does 
not give up his hope that the sublime pole of Love eventually triumphs, a general human 
hope with which he puts an end to The Magic Mountain:  
 
Farewell – and if thou livest or diest! Thy prospects are poor. The desperate dance, in 
which thy fortunes are caught up, will last yet many a sinful year; we should not care to 
set a high stake on thy life by the time it ends. We even confess that it is without great 
concern we leave the question open. Adventures of the flesh and in the spirit, while 
enhancing the simplicity, granted thee to know in the spirit what in the flesh thou scarcely 
couldst have done. Moments there were, when out of death, and the rebellion of the flesh, 
there came to thee, as thou tookest stock of thyself, a dream of love. Out of this universal 
feast of death, out of this extremity of fever, kindling the rain-washed evening sky to a 
fiery glow, may it be that Love one day shall mount? (Wird auch aus diesem Weltfest des 
Todes, auch aus der schlimmen Fieberbrunst, die rings den regnerischen Abendhimmel 
entzündet, einmal die Liebe steigen?) (716).  
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